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Wheeless Road 
Grade w B 
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5 145 101 
6 160 78 
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W B 
Terrace 
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Wheeless Road ____ 651 







1. School Capacities: 
Terrace Manor 21 classrooms 
Glenn Hills 13 




2. Pupils presently transported: 736. 
Pupil Allocation Plan. 
Terrace Manor Glenn Hills 
Grade W B Grade W B 
1 169 85 3 164 79 
2 180 74 4 50 47 
- -- --
349 159 214 126 
508 340 
31.3% B 37.0% B 
A-53 
Data. 
1. School Capacities: 
Griggs 21 classrooms 
Southside 15 
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Grade W B 
1 70 74 







To Garrett --------------------------------------------------- 191 
To National Hills ---------------------------------------- 150 
Garrett 
To Floyd -------------------------------------------------------- 118 
To National Hills -------------------------------------- 80 
National Hills 
To Floyd ------------------------------------------------------- 71 
To Garrett ---------------------------------------------------- 61 
Garrett (intern al) -------------------------------------- 42 
Total transportation estimate (maximum) _______ 713 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 




Griggs ___________________ _ 
Southside _____________ _ 
Totals _________________ __ _ 
Totals 
By Race School 
W B 
0 438 438 
665 10 675 
665 448 1113 
A-51 
Merry 
To Weed -------------------------------------------- 88 
To Robinson ------------------------------------------------- 168 
M.erry (internal) ---------------------------------------- 45 
Total transportation estimate (maximum) ______ __ 504 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 




Floyd _____________________ _ 
Garrett ________________ _ 
National Hills _____ _ 
Totals ___ ________________ _ 
Data. 
1. School Capacities: 
Totals 
By Race School 
W B 
461 461 
381 5 386 
233 233 
614 466 1080 




National Hills 14 
2. Pupils presently transported: 


































Supreme Court Of The United States 
OCTOBER TERM, 1972 
No .. ---
ANN GUNTER DRUMMOND, ET AL., 
Petitioners 
vs. 
ROBERT L. ACREE, ET AL., 
Respondents 
vs. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA, ET AL., 
Respondents 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
To the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit 
Petitioners pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue 
to r.eview the Judgment entered March 31, 1972 by 




The Judgment entered March 31, 1972 by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit is reported at 458 F.2d 486 (1972) set forth in 
Appendix I. It affirmed the Order of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia rendered January 13, 1972, reported at 336 
F.Supp. 1275 (1972) and set forth in Appendix III. 
JURISDICTION 
Petition for Rehearing on the Judgment entered 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit was denied May 2, 1972 and is set forth in 
Appendix IL The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked 
under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Can an order of the Distr ict Court which re-
quires that the racial composition of elementary 
schools be almost identical to the mathematical 
ratio of the entire system contrary to Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
402 U.S. 1 (1971), Winston-Salem/Forsythe Coun-
ty Board of Education v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 
(1972) be allowed to stand? 
2. To what extent is the increased transportation 
of elementary students to achieve racial balance 
constitutionally permissible? 
3. Does Swann, supra, require a school system, pre-
viously operating pursuant to a desegregation 
plan prepared by HEW and approved by the Dis-
trict Court, to immediately undergo massive bus-
ing without determining the feasibility of con-




1. School Capacities: 
Weed 12 classrooms 
Robinson 16 
Merry 22 
2. Pupils presently transported: 














































To Merry --------------------------------------------------- 42 
Robinson 
To Merry ----------------------------------------------------- 161 
A-49 
Data. 







2. Total presently transported: 0 
































Craig to Hains -------------------------------------------
Hains to Craig -------------------------------------------
189 
349 
Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 538 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 




Weed ___________________ _ 
Robinson _______________ _ 
Merry __________________ _ 
Totals ________ _ 
Totals 
By Race School 
W B 
63 160 223 
40 121 161 
485 91 576 
588 372 960 
A-48 
·' 
4. Is the 1972. Education Amendments Act which re-
states a portion of § 407 (a) Civil Rights Act of 
1964, forbidding Courts to order bussing for racial 
balance, a Congressional expression that the in-
terpretation of this language contained in Swann 
is incorrect? 
5. Is the 1972 Education Amendments Act a Con-
gressional determination on how best to imple-
ment the 14th Amendment so as to withdraw 
jurisdiction from the entire class of cases? 
CONSTITUTION AL PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
This case involves the following provisions of 
the Constitution of the United States: 
1. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 
(Necessary and Proper Clause) 
2. Article III, Section 1 and 2 
(Jurisdiction Clause) 
3. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment 
(Equal Protection Clause) 
4. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment 
(Enforcement Clause) 
STATEMENT 
1. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
(PRIOR TO 1970) 
Petitioners are a class of parents who were grant-
ed intervention in 1971.1 At that juncture this case 
1 Petitioners/Intervenors are Ann Gunter Drummond, Mason 
Carter Clements, Mrs. S. Lee Wallace, Nadine Estroff, Douglas 
D. Barnard, Jr., Robert Beattie, Bill Perry, Dr. James R. Hatta-
way, William J. Salley, Patrick G. Smith, C. Dan Cook, Earl 
E. Hensley, William B. Kuhlke, Jr., George H. Streeter, George 
W. Fisher, Freddie Childress, Leona Norton, H. Weldon Hair, 
Howard W. Poteet. 
3 
was already seven years old having been commenced 
in 1964 by black parents seeking to desegregate the 
school system. This litigation has followed the evo-
lution from "freedom of choice" in a pattern not dis-
similar to other school districts. 
Jurisdiction was assigned to the current District 
Court Judge shortly after his appointment in 1968. 
At a hearing held in December of that year the 
school board was directed to prepare a desegrega-
tion plan based on geographical zones and attendance 
areas. Acree v. County Board of Education of Rich-
mond Co., Ga., 294 F.Supp. 1034 (S.D.Ga. 1968). 
Such a plan was submitted and approved on July 
14, 1969. Acree v. County Board of Education of Rich-
mond Co., Ga., 301 F.Supp. 1285 (S.D.Ga. 1969). 
Shortly thereafter the school board was directed by 
the Court to seek the assistance of the Department 
of HEW in future planning. 
2. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
(1970) 
By order of February 3, 1970 the District Court 
required that the faculty be reconstituted on a racial 
balance of 60%-40% white to black. Accordingly, 
some 500 teachers were reassig,ned to achieve this 
distribution. Plaintiff subsequently appealed, and in 
July of 1970 the Circuit Court remanded this case 
for further findings. No decision was announced and 
jurisdiction was retained. 2 
Upon receipt of the Mandate, a Biracial Com-
2 This portion of the chronology appears to conflict slightly with 
that set out in Appendix III. It is supported by entries in the 




1. School Capacities: 
Jenkins 15 classrooms 
Fleming 32 
2. Pupils presently transported: 



































Jenkins to Fleming -----------------------------------
Fleming to Jenkins ------------------------------------






Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 412 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 




By Race School 
Schools 
Craig _______ __ _______ _ 













Grade W B 
3 170 118 







To W. Gardens ----------------------------------------
To Bungalow Rd. --------------------------------------
W. Gardens 
To White --------------------------------------------------------
To Bungalow Rd. __________________________ _ 
Bungalow Rd. 
To White -----------------------------------------------------
To W. Gardens --------------------------------------------
Bung,alow Rd. (internal) _______ ___ _____ __ ________ _ 









Total transportation estimate (maximum) ___ _______ 1279 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 





PLAN III ZONE E 
Totals 
By Race School 
W B 
7 286 293 
Fleming ____ _____________ _ 358 1 359 
Totals 365 287 652 
A-46 
mittee was appointed by the District Judge, charged 
with preparing recommendations for the possible 
pairing of schools in the system. Additionally, the 
desegregation plan developed by the Department of 
HEW had been completed and was submitted to the 
Court. It was approved by order dated August 3, 1970, 
with implementation scheduled for the forthcoming 
1970-1971 school year. 
Also incorporated in this order were the sugges-
tions of the Biracial Committee on pairing, as well 
as majority to minority transfer provisions required 
by Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School 
District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970). Also included 
was the proviso that space and free transportation 
be made available for the transferring, student. Ellis 
v. Board of Public Instruction, 423 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
3. PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF 
APPEALS (1970-1971) 
Pursuant to instructions, the Record had been 
returned to the Circuit Court in August of 1970 where 
it was retained for 11 months. During this period 
an .entire school year was completed under the Plan 
devised by the Department of HEW. In April of 1971, 
the decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). was announced. 
Accordingly, this case was remanded by the Appeals 
Court on July 1, 1971 with instructions to devise 
a new plan in consonance with that opinion. Acree v. 
County Board of Education of Richmond Co., Ga., 
443 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1971). 
5 
4. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
(1971-1972) 
Def end ant school board was instructed to com-
mence preparation at once. In a subsequent order of 
July 28, 1971 the District Court further requested 
that the Office of Education, Department of HEW, 
make its full resources available in this regard. 
A hearing on their proposals plan was scheduled 
for August 26, 1971. What transpired is described 
in the Court's Order: 
"To my amazement, the HEW officials did 
not show up at the August 26, 1971 hearing. 
Without notice or excuse, and at whose behest, 
I do not know, they did a disappearing act."3 
Being understandably irate, the Court rejected 
the school board recommendation with dispatch. It 
was announced from the Bench that experts would be 
employed for the preparation of desegration plans to 
be filed by September 27, 1971. Two Rhode Island 
professors were subsequently chosen. They drafted a 
series of options for the District Judge which con-
sisted of four Elementary Plans and two Secondary 
Plans. 
Intervention was sought at this crucial point. It 
was granted on October 5, 1971 and Petitioners, fresh-
ly garbed with legal status, set out to resolve the 
existing impasse. Unfortunately this goal was not 
achieved, but efforts to do so were later recognized 
in open court by the District Judge who remarked: 
"I say you deserve a lot of credit for what 
you have tried to do, to bring these warring fac-






Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 1560 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 





White ___________________ _ 

















1. School Capacities: 
White 31 classrooms 775 pupils 
W. Gardens 24 600 
Bungalow Rd. 29 725 
2. Pupils presently transported: 544 
Pupil Allocation Plan. 

















1 157 134 




Pupil Allocation Plan. 
Collins Bayvale 
Grade w B Grade w B 
5 172 136 1 177 131 
6 174 141 2 172 129 
7 166 162 3* 50 25 






Grade W B 
3# 134 105 




*25 each from SW corner of Collins attendance 
area. 
SE corner of Copeland attendance area. 







To Copeland ________________________________ _ 
Copeland 
To Collins _________________ ---------------------------------








tions, in a terribly polarized city and community 
together."4 
At the Intervenors request a hearing was held 
December 16th and 17th for the purpose of present-
ing evidence concerning the various Plans in ques-
tion. Upon conclusion the Bench announced that no 
decision was forthcoming for 20 days. All counsel 
were called into Chambers and strongly advised to 
make a final effort at negotiation. Efforts to reach 
an agreement ultimately proved futile and on January 
13, 1972 the Order complained of was entered. l5 Acree 
v. Drummond, 336 F.Supp. 1275 (S.D.Ga. 1972). 
5 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT 
OF APPEALS (1972) 
Plaintiff immediately commenced an Appeal and 
both remaining parties Cross-Appealed. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in an 
opinion rendered March 31, 1972 affirmed the ruling 
of the Lower Court. 6 Acree v. County Board of Edu-
cation of Richmond Co., Ga., 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 
1972). Petitioners sought Re-Hearing and were sub-
sequently denied. 7 
Pursuant to the Order on the Mandate, Defen-
dant school board prepared and presented a Consti-
tutionally-acceptable plan for the desegregation of the 
secondary schools in the upcoming year. By order 
dated June 13, 1972 this plan was approved by the 
District Court. 8 No appeals were taken, and the time 
for doing so has expired. 
4 Transcript of proceedings December 17, 1971, Page 266. 
l5 Appendix III hereto, details of Plan Appendix IV hereto. 
6 Appendix I hereto. 
7 Appendix II hereto. 
8 It is in sharp contrast with the severity of the elementary plan 
which Petitioners seek to have remoulded. 
7 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I 
THIS IS THE MOST EXTREME DESEGREGA-
TION ORDER EVER ENTERED! IT GOES FAR 
BEYOND ANYTHING APPROVED BY THIS 
COURT, AND IF DEEMED VALID THE CRITERIA 
ESTABLISHED BY SWANN BECOMES ABSO-
LUTELY MEANINGLESS. 
This claim, although extravagant, is well founded. 
All that is required to reach this conclusion in the 
present case is the application of principles established 
by Swann, and a comparison of results. 
While this Court recognized the transportation 
of students as a permissible tool for desegregation, 
its use was not made mandatory. Much to the con-
trary there is a clear caution that the techniques used 
in Charlotte were made acceptable by the situation 
which confronted the District Court. 
"On the facts of this case, we are unable to 
conclude that the order of the District Court is 
not reasonable, feasible and workable." (p. 30) 
(Emphasis added) 
An overall reading of this decision leaves the in-
delible impression that the best which can be said of 
the District Court's order is that it was not reversed. 
It was never applauded and reflects only tepid accep-
tance. Restraint rather than adherence is implicit and 
inclines one to view it as the outward limits of dis-
cretion. 
While a Court's authority to fashion appropriate 






To Lake Forest Dr. ---------------------------------
Lake Forest Dr. 
To Walker 
To Monte Sano -------------------------------------------
Lamar (internal) ----------------------------------------
Monte Sano (internal) -----------------------------









Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 1462 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 




PLAN III ZONE C 
Totals 
By Race School 
W B 
Collins __________ _ 0 928 
Bayvale __________ _______ _ 618 42 
Copeland 598 3 
Totals 1216 973 
Data. 
1. School Capacities: 










2. Pupils presently transported: 57 4. 
A-43 
2. Total presently transported: 546 
Pupil Allocation Plan. 
Walker 
Grade W B 
5 180 121 
6 162 145 





Grade W B 
3# 122 91 




*Lamar pupils only 
#Less Lamar 
1Lake F. Dr. only 



















Lake F. Dr. 
Grade W B 
l# 102 127 




To Lamar (2) -------------- ------------------- 125 
216 
116 
To Monte Sano (3,4) -------------------
To Lake Forest Dr. (1) ---------------------------
Lamar 
To Walker ( 5,6, 7) ________ _ _ __________ _ 




"No fixed or even substantially fixed guide-
lines can be established as to how far a court can 
go, but it must be recognized that there are limits." 
(p. 28) (Emphasis added) 
A recent lower court decision of considerable im-
portance underscored this limitation, Bradley v. The 
School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 
__ F.2d __ (4th Cir. 1972), decided June 5, 
1972. 
Although the outward parameters of Swann may 
be vague, certain prohibitions are most explicit. A 
prime example of what a District Judge may not do 
is illustrated by the claim that a particular degree of 
racial balance was required in Charlotte schools. 
The record discloses that the order resulted in 
elementary schools whose composition ranged from 
9 % to 38 % black as opposed to the system-wide aver-
age of 29 %. 
Chief Justice Burger articulated quite forcefully 
on this issue: 
"If we were to read the holding of the Dis-
trict Court to require, as a matter of substantive 
constitutional right, any particular degree of ra-
cial balance or mixing, that approach would be 
disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse." 
(p. 24) (Emphasis added) 
reiterated at Winston-Salem/Forstyth County Board 
of Education v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (1972). 
A comparison with the desegregation plan ordered 
for the elementary schools of Richmond County shows 
unquestionably that this imperative was either mis-
costrued or misapplied. 
This plan required that 29 of the existing 42 
9 
elementary schools be paired or grouped into 10 sepa-
rate zones with racial distribution as shown below: 9 
Zones Schools Pupils % Black 
A 4 1522 40.8 
B 4 2154 46.1 
C 3 2189 44.4 
D 3 1940 43.7 
E 2 652 44.0 
F 2 1198 30.2 
G 3 960 38.8 
H 3 1080 43.1 
I 2 1113 40.1 
ALT. 3 1684 34.2 
TOTALS 29 14,492 41.02 Overall Black 
From the diagram one is forced to conclude that 
awareness of the 60%-40% racial composition of the 
whole system was not utilized simply as a useful start-
ing point in shaping, a remedy. In the final analysis 
Court-ordered clustering results in an overall black 
percentage that deviates only 1.02% from the system 
average. 
Even the individual zones evidence a persistent 
abherence to this ratio. This point is illustrated by 
the permissible range of variation from the overall 
average. In Charlotte a fluctuaiton of 29% was ac-
cepted, whereas the latitude here is only 15 % or 1/ 2 
that amount. Stated conversely, the restriction im-
posed on Augusta was twice as extreme. 
Based on all these factors, it cannot be said that 
"the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was 
within the discretion of the Court." On the contrary, 








To Milledge ---------------------------------------------- 15 
To Telfair --------------------------------------------------- 10 
Houghton 
To Telfair --------------------------------------------------- 77 
To Evans -------------------------------------------- 120 
To Milledge ------------------------------------------------- 185 
Evans (internal) ---------------------------------------- 15 
Total Transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 952 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 




By Race School 
W B 
Walker _________________ _ 0 799 
Lamar ____________ ______ _ 345 131 
Monte Cano _________ _ 528 27 
Lake F. Dr. ___________ _ 289 35 
Totals 1162 992 
Data. 
1. School Capacities: 
Walker 43 classrooms 
Lamar 23 
Monte Sano 23 











Evans _____________________ 90 2 92 
Milledg.e ________________ 667 105 772 
Houghton __ ____________ 140 272 412 
Totals 901 621 1522 
Data. 
1. School Capacities: 




Milledge 31 775 
Houghton 22 550 
2. Total presently transported: 120. 








































To Evans -------------------- --------------------------------- 19 
86 To Milledge _________________________ _ 
A-40 
it is the product of a desegregation plan which relied 
entirely upon them. Such a standard is Constitution-
ally impermissible. 
These results are achieved by a massive increase 
in transportation. This is a volatile · subj.ect which 
Swann dealt with in a most guarded manner: 
"The scope of permissible transportation of 
students as an implement of a remedial decree has 
never been defined by this Court and by the very 
nature of the problem it cannot be defined with 
precision." (p. 29) 
Under the "Finger Plan" 9,300 additional elemen-
tary students were required to be transported from 
a total Charlotte elementary population of 44,000. No 
figures were reported on the number bused prior, but 
the total for the entire system amounted to 21 %. 
In Richmond County there are 21,795 elementary 
students, of which 6,945, or 31.86 % , were already be-
ing bused.10 The order of the District Court required 
a transportation increase of 6,172 elementary stu-
dents.11 
This escalation has very startling, consequences, 
for it creates a situation in which 61.77% of the ele-
mentary school children must now .be bused. 
Even more drastic is the impact upon the stu-
dents in the 29 schools paired or clustered. Under the 
HEW plan 21.57 % of the students .enrolled in these 
10All computations concerning Augusta-Richmond County Schools 
are based on figures contained in the Munzer Plans, a portion 
of which is set out in Appendix V hereto. . 
116,172 reflects the correct increase in elementary busing. It is 
in conflict with the figure of 5,681 as shown by the District 
Court's Order, Appendix III hereto, which fails to include Alter-
nate Zone. 
11 
schools were bused, a figure which now soars to 
64.16%. 
In considering the elementary portion of the Char-
lotte plan the Circuit Court determined that its in-
creases were too extreme. They illustrated this con-
clusion by a formula which provides a useful com-
parison here.12 
Percentage Increase of Additional Elementary 
Students Bussed As Opposed To All Students 
Charlotte 
Presently Bussed 
39 % or 33 % as Computed 
by Minority 
Richmond County 58 % 
By this standard the disparity is perhaps more 
apparent. The increased elementary busing in this 
case is at least 19% greater than the figure classified 
by one Court as too extreme. 
Even though this portion of Swann was ultimately 
reversed there is no indication that such increases 
would be approved elsewhere. Certainly there is noth-
ing to indicate that they could be expanded to an 
even greater extent. 
Perhaps the most formidable consequence of the 
District Court's Order is the effect it has on the grade 
structure of elementary schools. Previously the school 
system had been operated on a 7-2-3 basis which en-
abled a child to complete the first seven years in one 
school. 
Pursuant to this order 69 % of the elementary 
schools have been paired or clustered. They no longer 
12431 F.2d 138, 147 (4th Cir. 1970). 
12 
attending increases in times and distances. How-
ever, it is a reasonable and feasible plan which 
could be easily organized and administered. 
Plan III. 
Plan III results in a relatively small increase in 
transportation over Plan II. Its main feature is 
the effect on Floyd School which is an inner Black 
school. The total number of schools affected is 26. 
This plan is considered reasonable and feasible. It 
results in rather extensive chang,es in the total 
school system and therefore poses a more compli-
cated administrative problem. 
Plan IV. 
Plan IV results in virtually complete desegrega-
tion. One all-White and one all-Black school re-
main. However, 29 out of 38 elementary schools 
fall within the 30 to 50% range of per cent Black. 
The transportation is extensive and distances are 
approaching undesirable levels. Zone J, for ex-
ample, probably requires more than 45 minutes 
transportation time each way for children travel-
ing between Hornsby and either Hains or Flem-
ing. This plan can be justified as reasonable and 
feasible if transportation time of about one hour 
each way is acceptable. 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION 
PLAN III ZONE A 
Per Cent Black 40.8 
Schools Totals 
By Race School 
W B 
Telfair 4 242 246 
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4. The proposed allocation of pupils to schools 
and the effects on composition of enrollment. 
5. An estimate of transportation demanded to 
implement the proposed zone. 
6. Comments when needed. 
7. Two copies of this report contain maps for 
each plan. The maps indicate the various zon-
ing combinations which comprise the particu-
lar zones. 
The four plans for the elementary schools are or-
ganized to present four alternative levels of deseg;re-
gation. The fundamental basis for each plan is ex-
plained below. It should be noted that in all four plans 
the Houghton School is closed because of its age and 
poor condition. 
Plan I. 
Plan I is a minimal plan which .emphasizes de-
segregation of schools on the borders of the Black 
concentration in Augusta. In the main, Black 
schools are combined with contiguous and ad-
jacent White schools. In only one case, a Black 
school is zoned with two nearby schools. This plan 
affects the enrollments of 16 schools and develops 
a minimum of transportation problems related to 
time and distance. This plan is not only reasonable 
and feasible but it can be easily organized and 
administered. 
Plan II. 
Plan II extends the amount of desegregation to 
moderate levels. The number of schools affected is 
increased to 21. Transportation is increased with 
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have a standard grade structure, as the number of 
grades in a particular school depends on the number 
of schools in its zone. The size of the zone also dictates 
the number of schools a child must now attend during 
the course of elementary education. 
Seven zones are composed of either three or four 
schools. The students who attend these schools con-
stitute 53 % of the entire elementary population. Thus 
we have a situation which requires over 1/2 of the 
elementary children in the system to attend three or 
four separate schools in seven years. 
The absurdity of this arrangement is emphasized 
by comparison with the "F'inger Plan."13 It served to 
pair or cluster 46 % of Charlotte elementary schools 
in such a manner as to achieve a 1-4 and 5-6 grade 
structure. 
By these categories compulsory changes are mini-
mized. Elementary children will therefore attend, at 
the most, only two schools. This is a factor readily 
distinguished from the procrustean demands of the 
Augusta counterpart. 
A portion of Swann is addressed directly to this 
combination of evils: 
"An objection to transportation of students 
may have validity when the time or distance of 
travel is so great as to risk either the health of 
the children or significantly impinge on the edu-
cational process." (p. 30) 
Transportation of better than six of every ten 
elementary students, some over long distance, in con-
junction with the requirement that 53 % must attend 
1 a311 F.Supp. 265, 280, 281 (W.D. N. Car. 1970). 
13 
three or four elementary schools is indeed a situation 
which, "impinges on the educational process." 
A school desegregation plan must also have room 
for pragmatic considerations. A restriction is implicit 
in Swann: 
"25. The remedial technique of requiring 
bus transportation of public school students for 
purposes of racial desegregation is within a Fed-
eral District Court's power to provide equitable 
relief, where ... 
**** 
(2) implementation of the District Court's 
decree is well within the capacity of the local 
school authority." (Emphasis added) 
This was resolved affirmatively in Charlotte for 
obvious reasons. The school system had a total oper-
ating budg,et of $51,000,000 of which approximately 
$500,000, or less than 1 % (.0098), was spent for annual 
transportation costs.14 
The cost of increased elementary transportation 
was determined to be $672,000, or only 1.2% of the 
annual budget. Combined with current transportation 
expenditures it amounted to no more than 2.3 % of 
that budget. 
A radically different situation exists for Augusta's 
school system whose annual budget is only $21,000,000. 
Of this sum $572,000 was spent for transportation be-
fore the Court order. This is 2.7% of the total budget 
and represents a larger portion than was spent in 
Charlotte even after the increased elementary costs. 
Here the additional transportation will require 
$644,000, 1 ~ or 3. 7 % , of the budget. When combined 
14431 F.2d 138, 156 (4th Cir. 1970). 
1~This is a minimum figure and requires that schools be opened 





DESEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
of 
AUGUSTA AND RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA 
Prepared for Judge Alexander Lawrence 
by 
J. Howard Munzer 
and 
Myrl G. Herman 
THE PUPIL DESEGREGATION PLANS 
This report contains four plans for desegregating 
the elementary schools of Richmond County and two 
plans for desegregating the secondary schools. For 
purposes of clear presentation the design for these 
plans follows a uniform pattern. Each plan is noted 
by Roman numeral. Composite zones constituting each 
plan are labeled by capital letters. For example, Plan 
I contains five combinations of attendance zones. The 
combined zones are denoted as A, B, C, D and E. Each 
zone is organized separately. The information pertain-
ing to each zone is as follows: 
1. The zone designation. 
2. Present enrollment data of schools in the zone. 
3. Additional data on school capacities and trans-
portation. 
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that State or local authorities are practicing racial 
discrimination in assigning students to public schools 
shall be uniform throughout the United States. 
Application of Proviso of Section 407(a) of The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 To The Entire United States 
Sec. 806. The proviso of section 407 (a) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 providing in substance that 
no court or official of the United States shall be em-
powered to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial 
balance in any school by requiring the transportation 
of pupils or students from one school to another or 
one school district to another in order to achieve such 
racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power 
of the court to insure compliance with constitutional 
standards shall apply to all public school pupils and 
to every public school system, public school and public 
school board, as defined by title IV, under all circum-
stances and conditions and at all times in every State, 
district, territory, Commonwealth, or possession of 
the United States, regardless of whether the residence 
of such public school pupils or the principal offices 
of such public school system, public school or public 
school board is situated in the northern, eastern, 
western, or southern part of the United States. 
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with current outlays it amounts to some 5.8%. The 
aggregate of these costs, irrespective of percentages, 
is $44,000 more than the comparable figure in Char-
lotte. 
In the space of a single year this school system 
has been wrenched to an unbelievable extreme. Only 
12 months ago schools were operated under an HEW 
plan approved by the District Court. 
Without respite or interlude it is now decreed 
that an incredible gulf be leaped in a single bound. 
How has this all come about? The only plausible 
answer is that the lower court misread the require-
ments of Swann. 
Very persuasive support for this proposition is 
found in the words of the District Judge wherein he 
categorizes it as the "Busing" and "Racial Ratio 
Case".16 
Several other Courts have viewed it differently, 
and, I think, properly. 
"While this case approved the use of busing 
as one tool for school desegregation, it did not 
hold that the plan implemented in Charlotte was 
a Constitutionally commanded Plan, or that a less 
drastic Plan might not have met Constitutional 
requirements." Davis v. Board of Education of 
North Little Rock, Ark., 328 F.Supp. 1197, 1204 
(E.D. Ark. 1971). 
Even more emphatically: 
"We therefore, initially observe that while 
the Supreme Court found legally tolerable what 
may be ref erred to as the Mecklenburg rule, it by 
no means directed that its commands be obeyed 
everywhere. (p. 636) 
16Appendix III hereto. 
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And later: 
"Swann approved a District Court ordered 
plan for the busing of children to improve the 
racial mix in the involved school system. It did not, 
however, direct that a plan of transporting school 
children must be a part of every new plan for 
improvement of the objective of desegregation." 
GOSS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF 
KNOXVILLE, TENN., 444 F.2d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 
1971). (Emphasis added) 
Recent Courts in some instances have even found 
busing to be undesirable. A graphic example may be 
seen in Calhoun v. Cook, ___ F.Supp. ---, (N.D. 
Ga. 1972) decided June 8, 1972. Here the District 
Judges for the second time expressly rejected a mass 
busing plan for Atlanta, Georgia. 
This determination was reached after an incisive 
appraisal of busing, its ramifications, and the com-
peting interests involved. 
Such a conclusion is justified by the words of Chief 
Justice Burger: 
"A school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the 
framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial 
of a constitutional right. The task is to correct, 
by a balancing of the individual and collective in-
terests, the condition that off ends the Constitu-
tion." (Emphasis added.) (pp. 15, 16) 
This clearly contemplates that busing is a remedy 
that must be chosen and limited with regard to other 
values upon which it impinges. 
The availability of less rending solutions is well 
illustrated by the secondary schools. A constitutional 
plan for their desegregation was approved by the 
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criminatory system of school assignments based on 
geographic zones established without discrimination 
on account of race, religion, color, or national origin. 
( c) An applicable program means a program to 
which the General Education Provisions Act applies. 
Provision Relating To Court Appeals 
Sec. 803. Notwithstanding any other law or pro-
vision of law, in the case of any order on the part of 
any United States district court which requires the 
transfer or transportation of any student or students 
from any school attendance area prescribed by com-
petent State or local authority for the purposes of 
achieving a balance among students with respect to 
r ace, sex, religion, or socioeconomic status, the eff ec-
tiveness of such order shall be postponed until all ap-
peals in connection with such order have been ex-
hausted or, in the event no appeals are taken, until 
the time for such appeals has expired. This section 
shall expire at midnight on January 1, 1974. 
Provision Authorizing Intervention in Court Orders 
Sec. 804. A parent or guardian of a child, or par-
ents or guardians of children similarly situated, trans-
ported to a public school in accordance with a court 
order, may seek to reopen or intervene in the further 
implementation of such court order, currently in ef-
fect, if the time or distance of travel is so great as to 
risk the health of the student or significantly impinge 
on his or her educational process. 
Provision Requiring That Rules of Evidence 
Be Uniform 
Sec. 805. The rules of evidence required to prove 
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ported will be substantially inferior to those oppor-
tunities offered at the school to which such student 
would otherwise be assigned under a nondiscrimina-
tory system of school assignments based on geographic 
zones established without discrimination on account of 
race, religion, color, or national origin. 
(b) No officer, ag,ent, or employee of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (including 
the Office of Education), the Department of Justice, 
or any other Federal agency shall, by rule, regulation, 
order, guideline, or otherwise, (1) urge, persuade, in-
duce, or require any local education agency, or any 
private nonprofit agency, institution, or organization 
to use any funds derived from any State or local 
sources for any purpose, unless constitutionally re-
quired, for which Federal funds appropriated to carry 
out any applicable program may not be used, as pro-
vided in this section, or (2) condition the receipt of 
Federal funds under any Federal program upon any 
action by any State or local public officer or employee 
which would be prohibited by clause (1) on the part 
of a Federal officer or employee. No officer, agent, or 
employee of the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (including the Office of Education) or 
any other Federal agency shall urge, persuade, induce, 
or require any local education agency to undertake 
transportation of any student where the time or dis-
stance of travel is so great to risk the health of the 
child or significantly impinge on his or her educa-
tional process; or where the educational opportunities 
available at the school to which it is proposed that 
such student be transported will be substantially in-
ferior to those offered at the school to which such 
student would otherwise be assigned under a nondis-
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same Court on June 13, 1972. It did not require the 
extremes of the elementary plan, more importantly, 
it was accomplished without significant increase in 
busing. 
We therefore have a complete inversion with the 
burdens cast upon the young. Certainly this is a 
travesty Swann intended to avoid by recognizing 
that the limits on permissible transportation would 
be affected by many factors: 
". . . but probably with none more than the 
age of the students." (p. 31) (Emphasis added) 
II 
LEGISLATION ENACTED JUNE 23, 1972 IS 
IN APPARENT CONFLICT WITH CONCLUSIONS 
REACHED BY THIS COURT IN SW ANN. ITS 
LANGUAGE HAS NOT BEEN INTERPRETED BY 
ANY COURT AND GIVES RISE TO ISSUES 
WHICH MAY AFFECT EVERY AREA OF THE 
COUNTRY. 
The foregoing reflects quite aptly the vicissitudes 
of Constitutional interpretation in this area of law. 
Recent legislation promises further obfuscation and 
constitutes a valid quandary. 
With passage of the EDUCATION AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972 Congress has rejuvenated issues 
once thought resolved. The relevant provisions are 
set out in Title VIII, § 803-806, captioned "Prohibition 
Against Assignment or Transportation of Students 
to Overcome Racial Imbalance."17 
Of immediate significance is § 806 which directs 
I7Appendix IV hereto. 
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that a proviso, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, shall 
apply to the entire United States. The substance of 
this proviso is that no Court shall be empowered to 
order the transportation of students to achieve racial 
balance. It is a restatement of the identical language 
interpreted by Swann with the added requirement 
of uniform application. 
Obviously, however, Congress did not subscribe 
to the meaning accorded their words by this decision. 
Had this not been the case there would have been no 
need for subsequent repetition. 
All of this brings us to a perplexing impasse. 
§ 806, on its face, seems to preclude an order such as 
the one contained in this case. A result entirely to 
the contrary was reached by Swann based primarily 
upon the disparate status of de jure and de facto 
states. 
Both versions cannot be reconciled. The interpre-
tation arrived at by this Court depends upon a dis-
tinction, while uniformity requirements of subsequent 
identical legislation demand that there be none. 
A further example of the legislative intention to 
abrogate this historical distinction is provided by 
§ 805 which states: 
"The rules of evidence required to prove that 
State or local authorities are practicing racial 
discrimination in assigning students to public 
schools shall be uniform throughout the United 
States." 
Discrimination by state authorities is a basic in-
gredient of the facto - de jure, dichotomy. The stand-
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APENDIX IV • •I-• ••""1 -1....,,,.,1 ,.J:r, 
EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 
EN ACTED JUNE 23, 1972 
TITLE VIII-GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING 
TO THE ASSIGNMENT OR TRANSPORTATION 
OF STUDENTS 
Prohibition Against Assignment or Transportation of 
Students to Overcome Racial Imbalance 
Sec. 801. N..,Q_ £.:Ovision of J1!,~~ Act shall be con-
strued to require the assignment or transportation of 




Prohibition Against Use of Appropriated Funds 
For Busing 
Sec. 802(a). No funds appropriated for the pur-
pose of carrying out any · applicable program I}lay be 
u~ed f ~ h~ rtation _, of students or teachers 
( or for the pure aseol eqmpment for such transpor-
tation) in order to overcome racial imbalance in any 
school or school system, or for the transportation of 
students or teachers ( or for the purchase of equip-
ment for such transportation) in order to carry out 
a plan of racial desegregation of any school or school 
system, except on the express written voluntary re-
quest of appropriate local school officials. No such 
funds shall be made available for transportation when 
the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk 
the health of the children or significantly imping.e on 
the educational process of such children, or where the 
educational opportunities available at the school to 
which it is proposed that any such student be trans-
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basis, with the provisions for "Desegregation of Fac-
ulty and Other Staff" as set forth in Singleton v. Jack-
son Municipal Separate School District, et al., 419 F.2d 
1211 (5 Cir.). The School Board is directed to file 
semi-annual reports during each school year similar 
to those required in United States v. Hinds County 
School Board (5 Cir.), 433 F.2d 611, 618. 
(8) The pending motions filed by the plaintiffs 
for appointment of a receiver for the Richmond 
County system and for adjudging the defendants in 
contempt will be held in abeyance, at least for the 
present. 
(9) The evidence at the hearing on December 16, 
1971, indicates that there are numerous instances 
where pupils are attending schools in zones outside 
their actual residence. The Board, Superintendent 
and school officials are ordered promptly to undertake 
corrective measures in respect to boundary observ-
ance. A report in that respect shall be furnished not 
later than February 1, 1972. 
(10) The motion for award of attorney's fees to 
plaintiffs' counsel is granted. The amount of the fee 
will be settled on affidavits or, if necessary, following 
a hearing on the subject. 
(11) The defendant Board will, as a part of the 
costs in the case, pay the compensation and expenses 
of Messrs. Munzer and Herman for their services to 
this Court and same are assessed as costs ag,ainst de-
fendants. 
This 13th day of January, 1972. 
ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE 
Chief Judge, United States District Court 
Southern District of Georgia 
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Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 445 
F.2d 990, 1006, (10 Cir. 1971). 
Both of these sections are worded to insure abso-
lute parity. Such a result is incompatible with the 
perpetuation of this hoary distinction. There must 
now be one uniform classification of states. 
Consequently two alternative interpretations are 
possible. Either Congress has created a right of ac-
tion in de facto states or the prohibition of Court 
ordered transportation applies in de jure situations. 
The latter conclusion seems infinitely more plaus-
ible. It is substantiated by the fact that both provi-
sions are contained in legislation which is clearly 
recognized as "anti-busing" in nature. This considera-
tion is especially important with regard to § 806 whose 
language was first contained in the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, a measure concerned only with the promulgation 
of desegregation. 
The prohibition of Court ordered transportation 
for racial balance is a legitimate exercise of the "en-
forcement powers" granted Congress by § 5 of the 
14th Amendment. This is a positive grant of legis-
lative power entrusting to Congress the same broad 
powers afforded them by the "Necessary and Proper" 
clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Katzen-
back v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
By restating the law in this manner Congress has 
imposed a simple and prudent restriction on how the 
goals of this Amendment are best accomplished. De-
segregation is not prescribed, only a method. There 
are still half a dozen or more remedies, currently used 
19 
in school cases, which remain available to a District 
Court. 
Article III empowers Congress to create inferior 
Federal Courts. The Constitution grants no original 
jurisdiction to such courts, it comes from Congress. 
It is axiomatic, therefore, that the body empowered 
to grant jurisdiction may take it away. 
"The congressional power to 'ordain and estab-
lish' inferior courts includes the power of invest-
ing them with jurisdiction either limited, concur-
rent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction 
from them in the exact degrees and character 
which to Congress may seem proper for the public 
good." Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, (1943). 
Congress has therefore limited the jurisdiction 
of District Courts to issue busing orders. Jurisdiction 
is the power to declare the law and without it all that 
remain is to dismiss the cause. Ex parte McCARDLE, 
74 U.S. 264 (1869). 
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(3) Minor adjustments in the Plan may be made 
by def end ants as to alternate assignments in the in-
stance of special education classes provided that the 
desegregation levels outlined in the plans are main-
tained. 
( 4) The Superintendent of Schools shall file a 
report in writing with this Court on January 19, 1972, 
detailing what has been done by him and by the de-
fendant Board since this Order was signed in prepar-
ing, planning and carrying out the implementation of 
Phase One and Phase Two of Plan III. Similar written 
reports shall be filed by him at the end of each suc-
cessive three-day period after such date until further 
order of this Court. 
( 5) Meanwhile, the Court will continue to con-
sider and to endeavor to formulate and develop a 
feasible and sound plan of desegregation for the secon-
dary schools in the system. At the earliest practicable 
time an Order in that respect will be entered. The 
::econdary school plan approved and ordered by the 
Court will be implemented by defendants on Septem-
ber 1, 1972. 
(6) The defendant Board and the Superinten-
dent will file in this Court within 15 days a report 
showing the total enrollment during the present school 
year in every school in the system and the number of 
blacks and whites in each such school. The report will 
also include information as to racial composition of 
faculty and staff in the schools. 
(7) It is further ordered that the Board shall im-
mediately review existing staff and faculty racial 
ratios and shall forthwith comply, on a system-wide 
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that, there is at present no plan before the Court upon 
which it can act. Dr. Munzer and Mr. Herman pre-
sented two alternative plans for desegregation of 
secondary schools but at the hearing on December 16th 
last the possibility was raised that there might be dis-
crimination against the plaintiffs in that Josey and 
Laney High Schools, which are all-black or practically 
so, would no longer be graduating schools whereas 
none of the predominantly white senior high schools 
have been thus treated in the plans. I have asked that 
the experts suggest alternative plans as to the secon-
dary schools in the Richmond County system dealing 
with that problem. 
ORDER 
(1) It is ordered and decreed that the desegre-
gation of the elementary schools in the Richmond 
County system shall be in accordance with this Order. 
Defendants are directed promptly to take all neces-
sary steps to the end that Plan III shall be imple-
mented in the three phases described in this Order. 
No stay will be granted pending any appeal by any 
party from this Order. 
(2) Responsibility as to implementation will be 
and is imposed upon the Board and the Superintendent 
of Schools and they are ordered to fully and timely 
implement Plan III for the elementary schools. If the 
Board does not act promptly in any case in which any 
discretionary authority is conferred upon it by this 
Order, the discretion in that respect will be exercised 
by the Superintendent and he is directed in any such 




For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the 
petition for certiorari should be granted to review the 
order entered January 13, 1972, and the judgment 
entered March 31, 1972, by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
Respectfully submitted 
0. TORBITT IVEY, JR. 
Suite 500 
The 500 Building 
Augusta, Georgia 30902 
Attorney for Petitioners 
July 28, 1972 
HARRIS, CHANCE & McCRACKEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I have on this day served 
the Honorables Franklin H. Pierce, Leonard 0. Fletch-
er, Jr., and J. H. Ruffin, counsel for respondents, by 
personally handing them three copies each of the 
within Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
This 28 day of July, 1972. 
0. TORBITT IVEY, JR. 
Suite 50 
The 500 Building 
Augusta, Georgia 30902 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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ing schools designed to draw either from the white or 
black school population, not from both. New schools 
have been erected with resulting preservation of a 
segregated system. By and large, the Negro schools 
lie in the heart of a densely populated black area of 
Augusta. White schools follow residential patterns. 
Lack of new and more strategically located middle 
grade schools compound the problem. 
Irrespective of obstacles, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as construed by federal courts, demands that 
the dual system now in existence be "wiped out root 
and branch" and "not tomorrow but now." However, 
you cannot in one day chop down and dig up the 
stump of a tree which rooted two centuries ago. De-
seg,regation will be delayed on the secondary level until 
September 1, 1972. 5 It must be fully accomplished by 
that date and will be. As I stated on another occa-
sion, it is phantasy approaching autism to think that 
the Constitution of the United States treats Augusta 
differently from other places where a dual system is 
the result of de jure school segregation. Richmond 
County is no different from 42 other school districts 
in the Southern District of Georgia in which desegre-
gation is now an accomplished fact; admittedly with 
travail in certain cases. 
Earlier in this Order, I referred to some of the 
difficulties of mid-year desegregation, particularly 
high schools. At this time and during the current 
school year it would be chaotic, if not impossible, to 
implement any major plan in respect to desegregation 
of secondary schools in Richmond County. More than 
5 Of course, in event of appeal and reversal of this Order the 
Board must be prepared to desegregate all schools during this 
year. 
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race Manor and Wheeless Road schools. The percen-
tage of black pupils in Glenn Hills and Terrace Manor 
are high, averaging 48.1 per cent in the two schools. 
If these schools should be combined with Wheeless 
Road School which is predominantly white, the aver-
age percentage of black upils would be 34.2. There is 
presently a total enrollment of 1,684 pupils in the three 
schools and a capacity of 1,650 according to school 
data. Consequently, there is a need for two additional 
classrooms which, logically, would accommodate a class 
at Glenn Hill school and a class at Wheeless Road 
school. 
The result of combining Glenn Hills, Terrace 
Manor and Wheeless Road schools according to an 
analysis of pupil population and available space is 
shown below: 
Rms. 
Sp. Ed. Needed 
Pupils Class '71 Plan and 
per Room Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms Rooms 
Plan Grade Needs Tchr. '71 Avail. +or-
Terrace 
Manor 508 1-2 20 0-1 20 21 +1 
Glenn 
Hills 340 3-4 13 0-0 14 13 -1 
Wheeless 
Road 836 4-7 33 0-1 33 32 -1 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
The desegregation of the secondary school system 
in Richmond County presents the same difficulties 
that is experienced in any large urban school district. 
The problems stem not only from vestiges of State-
imposed segregation but from the practice since 1954 
of school boards perpetuating dual systems by build-
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APPENDIX 
ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND 
BY THE COURT: These are appeals from the 
order of the district court dated January 13, 1972, 
directing implementation of a desegregation plan for 
the schools of Richmond County, Georgia. The history 
of this case is well documented by the district court. 
Acree, et al v. Drummond, et al v. County Board of 
Education of Richmond County, Georgia. et. al, __ 
F. Supp. _ (S.D., Ga., January 13, 1972). 
The County Board of Education and Intervenors 
raise numerous objections to the desegregation plan 
being implemented by the district court, most of which 
do not even merit discussion. The major contention 
is that the district court erred in requiring "forced 
bussing" to achieve racial balance, in violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court made quite clear 
that bussing is an available tool for use by district 
courts in achieving school desegregation. In the instant 
case the district court utilized this tool along with 
the pairing, clustering and zoning methods long au-
thorized by the Supreme Court and this court. Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra; 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Boykins v. Fairfield Board 
of Education,_ F.2d _ (5th Cir., 1972) [No. 71-
3028, Feb. 23, 1972] ; Singleton v. Jackson Municipal 
Separate School District, 432 F.2d 927 (5th Cir., 1970). 
142 u.s.c. § 2000c. 
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education pupils at Robinson. Acceptable solutions in-
clude the following: 
(1) Move 6 classes for special education to Weed 
Elementary School or 
(2) Move Grade 6 to Weed Elementary School. 
The Board of Education may adopt one or the 
other of these solutions. 
Zone H 
Zone H clusters Floyd, Garrett and National Hills 
elementary schools. Pupil population and available 
space analysis indicates the following as to Zone H: 
Rms. 
Sp. Ed. Needed 
per Class '71 Plan and 
Plan Room Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms Rooms 
Pupils Grade Needs Tchr. '71 Avail. +or-
Floyd 309 6-7 12 0-0 12 23 +11 
Garrett 466 3-5 19 20-3 22 20 -2 
National 
Hills 305 1-2 12 0-0 12 14 +2 
There is an indicated shortage of two classrooms 
at Garrett. Solutions for this problem include: 
(1) The shifting of two special education classes 
to Floyd Elementary School or to National Hills. 
(2) The shifting of Grade 5 from Garrett to 
Floyd Elementary School. 
The Board of Education may adopt one or the 
other of these possible solutions. 
ALTERNATIVE PLAN 
(See pages 45 and 46 of original Munzer-Herman Plan) 




Sp. Ed. Needed 
Pupils Class '71 Plan and 
per Room Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms Rooms 
Plan Grade Needs Tchr. '71 Avail. +or-
Walker 932 5-7 38 43-3 41 43 +2 
Lamar 411 1-3 16 10-1 17 23 +6 
Monte Sano 544 3-4 22 0-0 22 23 +1 
Lake F.Dr. 267 1-2 11 0-0 11 13 +2 
Zone C 
Collins 951 5-7 38 19-2 40 41 +1 
Bayvale 684 1-3 27 0-0 27 29 +2 




Sp. Ed. Needed 
'71 Plan and 
per Room Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms Rooms 
Plan Grade Needs Tchr. '71 Avail. + or .. -
Craig 506 1-3 20 0-0 20 20 0 
Hains 692 4-7 28 0-0 28 30 +2 
Zone G 
Zone G, Plan III, clusters Weed, Robinson and 
Merry elementary schools. An analysis of pupil popu-
lation and available space in Zone G shows: 
funs. 
Sp. Ed. Needed 
Pupils Class '71 Plan and 
per Room Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms Rooms 
Plan Grade Needs Tchr. '71 Avail. +or-
Weed 143 5 6 0-0 6 12 +6 
Robinson 294 6-7 18 40-4 22 16 -6 
Merry 523 1-4 21 0-0 21 22 +1 
No space or special education problems are in-
valved in Zone G. A problem does exist which grows 
out of the need of six additional classrooms for special 
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ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND 
The argument that the equity powers of federal 
district courts have been limited by Title IV of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been rejected in Swann, 
where the Court found no intent on the part of Con-
gress to restrict the powers of federal cour ts to en-
force the equal protection clause or "to withdraw from 
courts their historic equitable remedial powers." 402 
U.S. at 17. 
The board and intervenors contend, however, that 
the district court's order ir reparably harms "quality 
education" in Richmond County. The district court 
should not, and did not, permit the use of such plati-
tudes to perpetuate a dual school system, nor could 
it permit defendants to reply on the inferiority of 
certain school facilities to which children wer e to be 
tr ansferred as a justification for continued racial dis-
crimination. The Court in Swann stated unequivocally: 
"In default by the school authorities of their ob-
ligation to pr off er acceptable remedies, a district 
court has broad power to f ashion a r emedy that 
will assure a unitary school system. 402 U.S. at 
16." 
The Richmond County Board of Education has op-
erated and continues to oper ate a de jure as well as 
a de facto segregated system, and has long been under 
order to desegregate. See Acree v. County Board of 
Education of Richmond County, Ga., 399 F.2d 151 
(5th Cir., 1968). Despite a clear duty, the Board has 
offer ed no viable constitutional alternative t o the plan 
implemented by the court below, but instead has en-
ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND 
gaged in conduct only designed to disrupt and delay 
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the disestablishment of a dual system. 
From our review of the plan adopted by the dis-
trict court and the evidence presented, we are of the 
firm view that there is no indication whatsoever that 
the transportation required as a result of the court's, 
plan would adversely affect the health of the children 
or impinge on the educational process. We are also 
convinced that a good faith effort by the school board 
will overcome any logistical problems that might arise. 
The issues raised by plaintiffs have been dealt 
with by our prior order of February 8, 1972, in which 
we required the district court to consider plaintiffs' 
alternate plan along with those submitted by the 
court's experts in the development of a unitary system 
for the secondary schools of Richmond County. 
We too recognize the practical problems which 
forced the district court to delay implementation of 
a plan for the secondary schools, and there are now 
little more than two months remaining in the school 
year. However, in view of the serious delays which 
have occurred in this case over past years, we order 
that a plan be developed immediately for the secon-
dary schools, that some demonstrable progress be 
made now2 and that a schedule be adopted forthwith 
in order that a constitutional plan will be implemented 
at the beginning of the 1972-73 school year. 
ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND 
The district court is required to take whatever 
steps are necessary under its equity powers to assure 
2 For example, transportation facilities needed as a result of the 
plan should be arranged, funds applied for, budget changes 
contemplated, etc. 
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As indicated by the above table, there is a short-
age of eleven rooms at Southside. The school district 
data furnished by the Superintendent's office shows 
that Southside has fifteen rooms. This would give it 
a capacity of 375 pupils on the basis of 25 pupils per 
classroom. However, it is noted that at the prese11,t 
time the school has an enrollment of 675. It follows 
that there must be more than fifteen classrooms at 
Southside elementary. Plan III, Zone I, indicates a 
school population of 650 at Southside which is smaller 
than the present enrollment figure. 
PHASE THREE, ELEMENTARY 
The third and final phase of desegregation of the 
elementary schools in Richmond County involves Zones 
B, C, F, G, H, and the Alternative Zone outlined on 
page 45 of the original plan of desegregation. Phase 
Three will be fully implemented on September 1, 1972. 
I have deferred the desegregation of the schools in 
these zones until the beginning of the next school year 
and in doing so have taken into consideration the fact 
that the transposition from a dual system to a unitary 
system will involve adjustments of a major character 
and that it is impractical and unwise to convert the 
system overnight at mid-year. 
Zones B, C and F in Plan Three present no space 
or special education problems. An analysis of pupil 
population and space availability in regard to the four 
Zones in question shows as follows: 
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PHASE TWO, ELEMENTARY 
Zone E 
Phase Two of the implementation of Plan III is 
approved and adopted and will be implemented not 
later than March 15, 1972. This Phase relates to Zone 
E and Zone I. 
Zone E is made up of Jenkins and Fleming ele-
mentary which will be paired. No problem exists in 
respect to special education pupils. 
An analysis of pupil population and available pupil 
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Zone I involves the pairing of Griggs and South-
side elementary schools. The transportation problem 
presents greater distances than Zones A, D or E. 
Griggs and Southside are located approximately 4.2 
miles straight line distance from each other. The 
analysis of pupil population and available space indi-
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compliance and cooperation from the school board in 
implementing a plan for the secondary schools and in 
carrying out the three phases of its desegregation plan 
for the elementary schools of Richmond County.3 
The order of the district court of January 13, 1972 
is AFFIRMED as modified herein. 
The mandate shall issue forthwith. 
3 The effect of the district court's plan, of course, is not to be 
ameliorated by such practices as segregation by race in the 
classroom. If the court receives evidence of such behavior, it 
should take further steps to enforce its decree. See Moses v. 
Washington Parish School Board, __ F.2d __ (5th Cir., 
1972) [No. 71-2561, March 8, 1972]. 
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Zone A presents no serious transportation prob-
lem. The distances are not great between the clustered 
schools. 
Zone D 
Under Plan III, Zone D, White, Wilkerson Gardens 
and Bungalow Road elementary schools are clustered. 
The Zone embraces a rather small geographical area 
and transportation distances are relatively short. 
There is no indication of space problems resulting 
from special education pupils. 
The plan proposed for clustering of these three 
elementary schools in Zone D is adopted and will be 
implemented at the same time as Zone A, that is, on 
or before February 14, 1972. The pupil population in 
the four schools in Zone Das related to available space 
will be approximately as is shown in the original plan. 
It is iluustrated in the table below: 
Rins. 
Sp. Ed. Needed 
Pupils Class '71 Plan and 
per Room Ch./ Sp.Ed. Rooms Rooms• 
Plan Grades Needs Tchr. '71 Avail. + or-
White 785 5-6 31 0-1 31** 31 0 
Wilkinson 
Gardens 576 1-2 23 0-1 23** 24 +1 
Bungalow 
Road 579 3-4 23 16-1 24 29 +5 
78 84 
0 The last column shows the number of rooms in excess ( +) if 
Plan III is implemented and if the special education population 
as of the Fall of 1971 does not move. The minus sign indicates 
room shortage. 
001 assume that no classroom is needed since no grouping of special 
education children is indicated for these schools. 
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The Court leaves to the Board of Education ( or 
Superintendent) the matter of determining whether 
Houghton Elementary should or should not be closed. 
If it is closed ( and the evidence satisfies the Court 
that it is substandard) solution one which involves no 
change from the Plan as originally presented as re-
lated to standard classrooms and grades seems pref-
erable. If it should be determined not to close Hough-
ton and if it should be included in Zone A along with 
Telfair, Evans and Milledge, the following distribu-
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APPENDIX III. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
AUGUSTA DIVISION 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1179 
ROBERT L. ACREE, et al., 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
ANN GUNTER DRUMMOND, MASON CARTER 
CLEMENTS, S. LEE WALLACE, NADINE 
ESTROFF, DOUGLAS D. BARNARD, JR., 
ROBERT BEATTIE, BILL PERRY, DR. JAMES 
B. HATTAWAY, WILLIAM J. SALLEY, PATRICK 
G. SMITM, C. DAN COOK, EARL H. HENSLEY, 
WILLIAM B. KUHLKE, JR., GEORGE H. 
STREETER, GEORGE W. FISHER, FREDDIE 
CHILDRESS, LEONA NORTON, H. WELDON 
HAIR, HOWARD W. POTEET, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention 
vs. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA, ET AL., 
Defendants 
ORDER 
This case has been around since 1964. I came into 
it in the Fall of 1968. 
At that time a freedom of choice plan was in 
effect in Richmond County schools. The total enroll-
ment of white and black children in 1967-1968 was 
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approximately 35,750 students. Of 12,250 Negro stu-
dents in the school population 5.5% chose to attend 
previously all-white schools. With one exception no 
white student had exercised freedom of choice to 
attend a previously all-black school. 
Judge Scarlett held hearings in the Spring of 1968 
on a motion by plaintiffs to adjudge the School Board 
in contempt and for summary judgment. He denied 
such relief. On oppeal the Fifth Circuit reversed that 
ruling. See 399 F.2d 151. The appellate court said: 
" ... we think it quite appropriate to point to the 
fact on the undisputed statistics presented to us 
it is clear that, with respect to the Richmond 
County Board of Education, a plan of desegre-
gating the schools, generally known as 'the free-
dom of choice' plan has not worked. It has not 
produced a unitary school system in which there 
are no longer Negro schools and white schools, 
generally known and recognized by all as such. 
Under these circumstances, it becomes the duty 
of the respondent Board, not only under the Su-
preme Court decisions above ref erred to, but un-
der our Jefferson decree, to take additional im-
portant and effective steps." 
After the ruling was handed down the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals assigned the case to me. A hear-
ing was held at Augusta in December, 1968. I said 
that freedom of choice was impermissible. It had not 
worked. The Supreme Court had made this clear in 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430; 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed2d 716 where the 
highest Court ruled that freedom of choice must be 
an effective device promising "meaningful and im-
mediate progress toward disestabilshing state-im-




Pupils Class Special Plan and Rooms 
per Room Ed. For Sp. Ed. Avail- Rooms 
Plan Grade Needs 1971 '71 able +I-
Telfair 431 6-7 17 31-2 19 19 0 
Evans 433 4-5 17 72-11 28 23 -5 
Milledge 658 1-3 26 0-0 26 31 +5 
As appears in the above table, there is a shortage 
of classrooms at Evans Elementary should no special 
education children be moved from that school. There 
are at least two solutions to this problem. Solution 
one would require the movement of five special edu-
cation classes from Evans to Milledge. Solution two 
would call for movement of the fourth grade from 
Evans to Milledge, that is to say, the fourth grade as 
presented in the Munzer-Herman Plan III. 
With respect to solution one, no change from Plan 
III as originally presented is required other than the 
movement of the special education children as ref erred 
to above. 
Under the second solution, the following atten-
dance results would obtain: 
Telfair Milledge Evans 
Grades w B Grades w B 
Same as in 1 153 91 5 126 86 
original Plan 2 154 91 
3 102 67 
4 121 100 
- - --
530 349 
Total 879 Total 212 
Percentage Percentage 
of Blacks 38.5% of Blacks 40.6% 
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Houghton) and by Zone D (White, Wilkerson Gardens 
and Bungalow Road elementary schools). I will com-
ment subsequently on the closing of Houghton elemen-
tary. 
Phase Two will be implemented on or before March 
15, 1972. This Phase involves Zones E and I under 
Plan III. The elementary schools affected are Jenkins 
and Fleming which will be paired and Griggs and 
Southside which will likewis.e be paired on or before 
March 15th next. 
Plan III as related to other elementary schools in 
the system will be implemented on September 1, 1972. 
Below is reviewed the effect of Plan III on the 
elementary schools with special relation to pupil popu-
lation and available classroom space. 
PHASE ONE, PLAN III 
ELEMENTARY, SCHOOLS 
Zone A 
At the .evidentiary hearing on December 16, 1971, 
objections were raised by the Intervenors to the clos-
ing of Houghton elementary as proposed in each of 
the four elementary plans involving Zone A. Oppon-
ents thereof did not believe that the three other ele-
mentary schools in the Zone (Evans, Telfair and Mil-
ledge) would he capable of housing both regular 
classes and the special education classes, particularly 
the special education pupils at Evans. 
An analysis of pupil population and available space 
in Zone A is set out below. It indicates that there is 
adequate space at Telfair, Evans and Milledge for all 
pupils, including special education children. 
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on a school board today is to come forward with a 
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises 
realistically to work now." 
I did not rule out freedom of choice altogether 
but stated that I would "give consideration to a plan 
formulated by the Board which combines automatic 
assignment of pupils within designated g,eographical 
zones and a limited freedom of choice of schools." 
See Acree v. County Board of Education of Richmond 
County, Georgia, 294 F. Supp. 1034. I directed that a 
zone or attendance area system be put into effect for 
the 1969-1970 school year. 
On June 16, 1969, a hearing on the Board's plan 
was held at Augusta. Plaintiffs objected to it in toto. 
On July 14, 1969, I approved the plan presented as a 
temporary expedient. See 301 F. Supp. 1285. I pointed 
out: 
"The decisions of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit say that geographic zones are ac-
ceptable only if they tend to disestablish rather 
than reinforce the dual system of segregated 
schools. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners 
of Mobile County, 393 F.2d 690; United States of 
America v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School 
District, 406 F.2d 1086 (Feb. 4, 1969); Henry v. 
Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, 
409 F.2d 682. A school board must strive for pro-
motion of desegregation and 'conscious effort 
should he made to move bou:p.dary lines and change 
feeder patterns which tend to preserve ·segrega-
tion.' See 393 F.2d at 694." 
I further stated: 
"I think the wisest thing to do at this time, cer-
tainly the most expedient, is to approve tempo-
rarily the Board's new zone system and permit 
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same to go into effect at the beginning of the 
coming (1969-70) school year. We will soon there-
after be able to judge its effects. Because of pos-
sible constitutional infirmities of the zoning plan 
it will not be permanent and this is not a final 
order." 
My Order of July 16, 1969, directed the School 
Board and Superintendent to apply immediately to 
the Office of Education, H.E. W., for professional 
counselling and assistance looking to development of 
a satisfactory and legal plan at an early date. 
Before such a plan could be developed and pre-
sented the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This was in March, 
1970. On July 1st of that year that Court remanded 
the case. See 443 F.2d 1360. The higher Court said: 
"Having examined the record and the briefs of 
counsel in the above styled and numbered cause, 
this Court is left with a very definite and indelible 
impression - the Richmond County, Georgia pub-
lic schools are racially identifiable, both as to the 
faculty and the composition of the respective stu-
dent bodies. If there is any hope remaining for 
the Richmond County public schools to operate 
as a unitary system by the commencement of the 
new school year - prompt and immediate action 
is required." 
In compliance with the Order by the Fifth Circuit 
a hearing was held and evidence introduced on July 
30, 1970. On August 3rd I approved a plan recom-
mended by Health, Education and Welfare which I 
modified to include additional pairing. It was essen-
tially a neighborhood plan. The Fifth Circuit had g,one 
along with something similar in the case of Ellis v. 
Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 
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with. To obviate the system being closed down indefi-
nitely I permitted the carrying on of a dual system 
at the beginning of the year. It is still in effect. 
Last June I handed down an Order which fully 
integ;rated the secondary schools in the Chatham 
County system (with one necessary exception.). I de-
layed action on the elementary level as the Board 
wished more time and had not been able to agree on 
a plan. My decision was appealed and the ruling re-
versed. This Court was instructed to "forthwith" de-
segregate the elementary as well as secondary schools. 
This was done by the Court early in September, 1971. 
The situation in the Chatham County school case dif-
fers only from the Richmond County case in that the 
former involved the beginning of a school year and 
the latter the middle of such a year. 
I realize that February is a poor time to revolu-
tionize a school system. Significant educational prob-
lems are especially involved in massive changes in 
student populations of senior high schools during the 
academic year. Student schedules have already been 
planned for the year. Athletic programs have been 
developed and implemented. Seniors have spent one 
half of the year in present locations and have planned 
senior year activities, including ordering rings and 
yearbooks. 
But a start must be and will be made. It will com-
mence with certain elementary schools and will beef-
f ectuated in three phases. Phase One of Plan III pro-
posed by the Court's experts will be implemented not 
later than February 15, 1972. The initial implementa-
tion will apply to two clusters of elementary schools 
represented by Zone A (Telfair, Evans, Milledge and 
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buses would be required at a cost of $12,400 each with 
an annual operational cost of $5,000 per bus. 4 Under 
Plan III, 5,681 additional elementary students would 
be transported. On the secondary level, Plan I con-
templates bussing of 1,644 additional high school and 
junior high students. Plan II (secondary) calls for the 
transportation of 2,150 more students than are now 
being bussed. The estimates of increased transporta-
tion needs are possibly over-estimated by Dr. Munzer 
and Mr. Herman. 
Counsel requested the Court to delay implemen-
tation of any plan pending discussions among the 
parties as to devising one (particularly on the secon-
dary school level) which would be satisfactory. I 
granted a twenty-day .extension for that purpose. That 
period has passed without any agreement being reach-
ed. Of course, in any event, the parties would not be 
permitted to stipulate away the mandate of the Con-
stitution as to establishment of a unitary school sys-
tem - one in which there are neither white nor black 
schools, just schools. 
On July 1, 1971, the Fifth Circuit ordered that 
this Court require the Richmond County School Board 
"forthwith" to constitute and implement a constitu-
tional student assignment plan. That means now, at 
once, without delay or interval. Because of the Board's 
wilful failure to carry out its constitutional duty the 
mandate of the higher Court could not be complied 
4 The same objection as to cost of increased transportation was 
made in the Savannah case. With staggered bus schedules, the 
increased needs have been handled (though with difficulty) by 
the existing equipment. The Chatham County system has ap-
proximately the same number of buses as Richmond County and 
about the same enrollment. 
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I 
Florida, 423 F.2d 203. I took that route. The plan in 
question was to be implemented at the 1970-1971 
school year. 
My Order of August 3, 1970, in the Acree case 
was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Meanwhile, the 
"busing" and racial ratio cases, including Swann v. 
Charlotte - Mecklenburg Board of Education had 
reached the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
Court of Appeals held its ruling in abeyance pending 
a decision in Swann and the other cases. It was handed 
down by the Supreme Court on April 20, 1971. See 
402 U.S. 1-48. That decision made it clear (I quote the 
syllabus in Swann) that: 
(a) While the existence of a small number of 
one-race, or virtually one-race, schools does not in it-
self denote a system that still practices segregation 
by law, the court should scrutinize such schools and 
require the school authorities to satisfy the court that 
the racial composition does not result from present 
or past discriminatory action on their part.1 
(b) A student assignment plan is not acceptable 
merely because it appears to be neutral, for such a 
plan may fail to counteract the continuing effects of 
past school segregation. The pairing and grouping of 
noncontiguous zones is a permissible tool. 
( c) The District Court's conclusion that assign-
ment of children to the school nearest their home serv-
ing their grade would not effectively dismantle the 
dual system is supported by the record, and the reme-
1 The Fifth Circuit has been telling us for years that "If in a school 
district there are still all-Negro schools or only a small fraction 
of Negroes enrolled in white schools ... then as a matter of law 
the existing plan fails to meet constitutional standards established 
in Green." Adams v. Mathews, 403 F.2d 181. 
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dial technique of requiring bus transportation as a 
tool of school desegregation was within that court's 
power to provide equitable relief. 
On July 1, 1971, the Court of Appeals for this 
Circuit disapproved the plan which this Court had 
approved in July, 1970, to be put into effect during 
the current school year. It remanded the case, stating: 
"The judgment of the district court as it relates 
to student and faculty assignment is vacated and 
the case is remanded with direction that the dis-
trict court require the school board forthwith to 
constitute and implement a student and faculty 
assignment plan that complies with the principles 
established in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 1971, __ U.S. --, __ 
_ S.Ct. _ _ L.Ed.2d_ , 39 Law Week 
4437; Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School 
Board, 5 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 875, and Singleton v. 
Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir., 
1970, 419 F.2d 1211, insofar as they relate to the 
issues presented in this case." 
The Court of Appeals has said that the prevailing 
system is a dual and an unconstitutional one. The ra-
cial statistics bear this out beyond all doubt. They 
reveal that in the elmentary schools during the 1970-
1971 year seventeen were predominantly white and 
nine predominantly black. 2 There were four all-black 
elementary schools and one all-white. In eleven ele-
mentary schools the minority attendance was 5% or 
less of the whole and in three other schools the 
minority ratio was 10% or less of the entire school 
population .. 3 On the secondary school level in 1970-
2 I have used an 85% ratio as illustrating a predominantly white 
or predominantly black school. 
3 For example, at Southside this year there are 680 students of 
whom 8 are black. 
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At my suggestion, the Intervenors presented a 
plan for consideration. It is entitled "Quality Educa-
tion Plan for the People of Richmond County, Geor-
gia." The plan is nothing more than Freedom of Choice 
both for students and faculty. Since the Intervenors 
have a right of appeal from this Order the higher 
court can enlighten us as to my evaluation of the 
"plan" proposed. Anyone who has even casually ex-
amined the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court and of the Court of Appeals for this Circuit 
must know that choice plans are not constitutionally 
acceptable in a case such as this. In fact, the latter 
Court said exactly as much concerning the Richmond 
County system. See 399 F.2d 152. 
On October 8, 1971, Dr. Munzer and Mr. Herman 
returned to Augusta to confer with the Court con-
cerning the proposed desegregation plans. On the same 
day, with counsel and the Superintendent of Schools 
present, the plans were explained and discussed by the 
experts in the courtroom. 
A full evidentiary hearing was held on December 
16-17, 1971, for the purpose of considering a plan and 
for hearing evidence which the Intervenors desired to 
offer in opposition thereto. Witnesses for the Inter-
venors testified as to the effect of the Munzer-Herman 
plans on the R.O.T.C. program and on the exceptional 
children and model reading programs. The Director 
of Transportation stated that the Richmond County 
school system has 97 buses, including four assigned 
to special education. Eighty-three operate daily and 
there are 10 spare buses. In the last school year more 
than 12,000 students of a total of 34,619 were bussed. 
It was estimated that under the proposed plan 27 new 
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and Johnson has 442 students, 39% black. The basic 
difference in the two secondary school Plans is that 
Plan I does not involve Sandbar Ferry or Sego 
whereas under Plan II these two schools are paired in 
such a way that Sandbar Ferry is grade 8 and Sego 
is grade 9. 
After the plans were filed, I asked the parties for 
their analysis, comments and criticisms. The plaintiffs 
complained, among other thing,s, that presently all-
black Laney and Josey were reduced in status from 
graduating high schools and that this was not done 
in the case of any predominantly white senior high 
school. 
The Board's response was of expected quality and 
content. It raises every carping, contumacious objec-
tion conceivable. It is a mishmash and embranglement 
of letters from individual members of the Board, the 
Superintendent and principals opposing desegregation 
of the system. There are resolutions, letters, speeches, 
newspaper clippings, et cetera. The response contrib-
utes less than nothing to the difficult problem the 
Board faced but fled. 
Meanwhile, in October, 1971, I permitted a group 
of white parents to intervene who are opposed to bus-
ing, though they say they are not opposed to integra-
tion per se. I will add that if there is any way to dis-
mantle a dual school system, and the Richmond County 
Board perpetuated one long after the 1954 decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, I am 
not aware how the constitutional imperative can ever 
be achieved without substantially increasing the trans-
portation of students. 
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1971, out of seventeen schools there was one all-black 
and two 99% black schools. There were six predomi-
nantly white schools in which the Negro ratio was less 
than 10% and two predominantly black schools with 
an attendance by white students of 6% or less. Two 
other secondary schools had a white ratio of 88% of 
the school population. 
The current school year has produced inevitably 
(since the same plan is in effect) the same segregated 
picture. The projected attendance indicated that there 
are forty-one schools in which white students pre-
dominate. They have a total enrollment of 24,721 of 
whom 20,648 are white and 4,073 are black. In eighteen 
black schools in the system which have a total enroll-
ment of 12,941 there are 360 white students (2.8%). 
Following the decision of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals on July 1, 1971, I promptly ordered the Board 
to present a student and faculty assignment plan to 
this Court not later than July 21, 1971. I assigned a 
hearing on it for July 28th. Subsequently, upon oral 
request I extended to August 26th the time for pre-
sentation of such a plan. A hearing was held on that 
date. 
To my amazement, the H.E.W. officials did not 
show up at the August 26, 1971, hearing. Without 
notice or excuse and at whose behest I do not know 
they did a disappearing act. The Board's behavior was 
no less contemptible. They passed the buck to the 
Superintendent of Schools, who, no doubt under in-
structions, presented a "plan" to the Court on behalf 
of the Board. What that individual did recommend 
does not surprise me in the light of his statement to 
this Court at the hearing held in Augusta on Decem-
A-13 
ber 16, 1971. I inquired of him what plan he would 
sugg.est to the Court for the integration of the school 
system and his reply was, "Freedom of Choice." The 
plan presented by the School Superintendent at the 
"hearing" on August 26th last was to keep the school 
zones as they were except for two or three minor 
changes as to boundaries. One of them would have 
transferred about 100 white students to an all-black 
high school. This plan, so learned counsel for the 
Board informed me, made the system a unitary one, 
if it was not already such. 
In Acree v. County Board of Education of Rich-
mond County, 399 F.2d 151, the Court of Appeals said: 
"We think it not necessary to do more than call the 
attention of the respondent here to the extremely im-
portant obligation which is once more placed on the 
Board to assume its full responsibility to do all that 
is reasonably feasible, and now, to bring an end to the 
dual system of white and Negro schools in Richmond 
County." The Richmond County Board and its Super-
intendent have abdicated their responsibility. They 
have been contemptuous and intransigent. They have 
chosen to ignore the Constitution and the courts. Ap-
parently, they, together with a segment of the popu-
lation of Richmond County, deem themselves above 
and beyond the law. The Fourteenth Amendment is 
not to apply to those who find it not to their liking. 
At the conclusion of the August hearing I stated 
that this Court would employ its own .experts at the 
Board's expense to do what it and the school officials 
refused to do in the way of devising a plan of desegre-
gation. Five days later the Court obtained the services 
of two well-known educators, experienced in desegre-
A-14 
gation planning, Dr. J. Howard Munzer and Myrl G. 
Herman of the faculty of Rhode Island College. 
Alternative plans were presented in the Munzer-
Herman suggestions which were filed in this Court on 
September 27, 1971. The several Plans do not set out 
to establish any set numerical r atio of blacks to whites. 
However, through clustering and pairing it achieves 
a not dissimilar result. 
Four elementary school plans are proposed. Plan I 
involves an unecceptable minimum amount of integra-
tion. Plan II involves more desegregation and Plan III 
(which I am adopting) even more. Plan IV would 
provide for maximum desegregation embraced and 
involved all but two elementary schools. 
Two plans were presented for desegregation of 
the secondary schools. The plan is the same for the 
following schools: Josey, Murphey, Butler, Tutt, 
Langford, Richmond Academy and Laney. Under both 
Plan I and Plan II at the secondary level the schools 
mentioned would house the following grades. 
Josey - Grades 8-9 
Murphey - Grade 10 
Butler - Grades 11-12 
Tutt - Grades 8-9 
Langford - Grades 8-9 
Richmond Academy - Grades 11-12 
Laney - Grade 10 
In both Plan I and Plan II Tubman will house 
grade 8 and Johnson grade 9. However, under Plan I 
Tubman would have 511 students, 50% black, and 
Johnson would have 492 students, 45% black, whereas 




Drummond, et al. 
v. Reapplication For Stay 
Acree, et al. 
August , 1972 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, Circuit Justice. 
This application, filed by parent-intervenors in 
~ 
this school desegregation case-from Richmond 
County (Augusta), Georgia, seeks a stay of a judgment 
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That 
court, on March 31, 1972, affirmed an order of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
adoP.tin& 
Georgia Hffelliii a plan for the desegregation of 29 
elementary schools in Augusta. Acree v. County Board 
of Education of Richmond County, 458 F .2d 486 (1972). 
On two previous occasions, I have denied stay application 
in this case. On February//, 1972 I refused to stay 
the District Court's order pending appeal to the Fifth 
~c~ After the Fifth Circuit's affirmance, I 
[ agai!}] denied 5"affie1'"" ..... ..t· en · Jes ,,_. 
11,.4-~ ~ ,,.. '6 lJ e ('/ cJ. 
becauseJ\.R8 st:ay had~ been i&tJE§ht from the appropriate 
Court of Appeals as required by Rule 27 of the Supreme 
Court Rules. Applicants immediately sought a stay 
~ ~ ~~/_I 
from the Fifth Circuit...,~at stay having oaw been 
~ 
- ,1.,,. .. • ,..f'h Applicants have reapplied to me. 
I\ 
- ;)_-
This reapplication is premised solely on the 
contention that a stay is required under section 
803 of the Education Amerrtlments of 1972. That 
sectiorf. appro•1ed by Gont;,ress en Jt1fle 23, t9n::\S- -
reads in pertinent part as follows, 
"in the case of any order on the part of any 
United States District Court which requires the 
transfer or transportation of any student ••• 
for the purpose1 of achieving a balance among 
students with respect to race ••• , the 
effectiveness of such order shall be postponed 
until all appeals ••• have been exhausted 
II 
• • • • 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, § 803 
(June 23, 1972)(emphasis added).I By its terms, the 
statute requires that the effectiveness of a District 
Court order be postponed pending appeal only if the 
order requires the"transfer or transportation" of 
students "for the purposet of achieving a balance 
among students with respect to race." It does not ~ 
, . . J I J • /} ' /,µ k 
~ ~~ ~ ~~~bf -
purport to block all desegregation orders.I\ Jif Congress 
had desired to stay all such orders it could have used 
~~J½C-~ 
A language appropriate to that result. ..Inseeei; in the.. 
~eg,ign •-Odiate]y precedje~ sootica 809, Q1agzqa, 
""4ewanstrated j tw aei? j ty to spsih mu1111 kmoadJ Jr x±ar •'le... 
':fj .., J,,J, ,~e,e./e, ,ee.f-1n, 1031 
88 s•e•••s In section 802(a) Congress prohibited the 
'" use of federal funds to aid in any program for the 
transportation of students if the design of the 
/ 
--3--
\ f'J/' to/ 
program is to "overcome racial imbalance" ~arry 
out a plan of desegregation." Education Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-318, i 802(a) (June 23, 1972) (emphasis 
added). Congress 
be 
intended section 803 to fjff#i#significantly narrower 
in scope than section 802(a). 
Fl:!rt:hermere~, i n light of this Court's holding 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971), it could hardly be contended that 
Congress was unaware of the legal significance of 
its "racial balance" language. In that case the school 
authorities argued that section 407(a) of the Civil 
J'I.>. u,s.c . .,- .;,ooo,- ~.) 
Rights Act of 1964 restricted the power of federal 
I\ 
courts in prescribing a method for correcting state-
imposed segregation. The Chief Justice's interpretation 
'{ec+io,,. 'IO 7(0)/ s 
ofbat see,t.i.oR'(" which appliesf' only to orders "seeking 
0., 
to achieve racial balance " is controlling here 1 
A I\ 
"The proviso in (§ 407(ar.J is in terms designed to 
foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding 
the existing powers of federal courts to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause. There is no suggestion 
of an intention to restrict those powers or 
withdraw from the courts their historic equitable 
remedial powers." 'f()"J_ U. !, o.-f 11[e~ptior, ;,.. or''11~a/),, 
an ge already given an 
----- ~ by the Supreme Court, 
,+,$ 
must be presumed to have intended that e:hciJ 
V 
Rider A, p. 3 
It is clear from the juxtaposition and the language 
of these two sections that Congress intended to proscribe the 
use of Federal funds for the busing of students under any 
desegregation plan but limited the stay provisions of 
Section 803 to desegregation plans which seek to achieve 
r acial balance. 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education , 
402 U.S. 1 (1971), it could hardly be contended that 
Congress was unaware of the legal significance of 
its "racial balance" language . In that case the school 
authorities argued that sect ion 407(a) of the Civil 
>"'~ u,!.c. '5' .;,ooo,- 6_, 
Rights Act of 1964 restricted the power of federal 
/\ 
courts in prescribing a method for correcting state-
imposed segregation . The Chief Justice ' s interpretation 
'{ec +io.., t/D 7(0)/ $ 
ofbat sectioa'("" which applies( only to orders "seeking 
0.., 
to achieve racial balance " is controlling here 1 
" " 
"The proviso in [§ 407(a!J is in terms designed to 
foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding 
the existing powers of federal courts to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clluse. There is no suggestion 
of an intention to rastrict those powers or 
withdraw from the courts their historic equitable 
remedial powers." '(O'J... U. !. o.+ 11['e,,,pliori" ;,, or'111~a/)_ 




must be presumed to have intended that elmis 
--4--
words receive the same interpretation. 
The 
the lower court order in this case was for the purpose 
of achieving a racial balance. This question was resolved 
~ ~~t:J_j~ 
Aby the Court of . Appeals. Applicants cLaimed on their 
appeal that the District Court order called for forced 
busing to "achieve racial balance." 458 F. 2d at 487. 
The court rejected that contention, citing the holding 
in Swann that bus 
lrn.Jz,; l>--j H...-t...-
transportation is ai.i:;L---ct¥lr.·1::-±1Ett)±e-t:~ 
' ~ 
~ ng school desegregatio~ r N; thing ~n the A ___________ _ 
District Court's opinion or final order, nor anything 
2/ 
in the history of this protracted litigation, indicates 
that the court departed from the requirements and 
Since the court order was not entered for the 
purpose of "achieving a balance among students with 
respect to race" in the Augusta elementary schools t 
section 803 does not apply. This stay application 
must, therefore, be denied. 
It is so ordered. 
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words receive the same interpretation. 
The 
the lower court order in this case was for the purpose 
of achieving a racial balance. This question was resolved 
u-- }4~,c,!_j~ 
Aby the Court o f. Appeals . Applicants c~aimed on their 
appeal that the District Court order called for forced 
busing to "achieve racial balance . " 458 F.2d at 487. 
The court rejected that contention , citing the holding 
in Swann that bus 
• 
t:rn.L l>--j ~ 
transportation is a.o-atV--F-.H·c:-±1~tc-e--f:n 
A 
~ ngschool desegregatio~ ~~thing ·in the 
Rider A, p. 4 
4i For the purpose of acting on this application, 
I accept the holdings of the courts below that the order 
·fv ~~~ ~ 
was enteredJ f o r f desegregating a sc?ool system 
in accordance with the mandate of Swann and not for the 
purpose of achieving racial balance. 
must, theretore, be denied. 
It is so ordered. 
FOOTNOTES 
1/ 
A stay has also been denied by the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 
on August 18, 1972 • 
... JJ For a complete history of this litigation see the 
most recent opinion of the District Court. Acree v, 
Drummond, 336 F. Supp. 1275 (1972). 
•- ,...., """ - Dra f t as dictated on phone by Larry 8/31/72 
~'( 
P 3 
In short, as used in Section 407a the phrase 
"achieving racial balance" was used in the context of 
eliminating de facto segregation. 
The Court went on to caution lower federal 
courts that, in the exercise of their broad remedial 
powers, their focus must be on dismantling dual school 
systems rather than on achieving perfect racial balance: 
"The constitutional command to desegregate schools does 
not mean that every school in every community must always 
reflect the racial composition of the school system as 
' \:[§ 
a whole.fl This was said not in condemnation of existing 
techniques but in disapproval of _pl,,,e wooden resort to 
racial quotas or racial balance. Nothing in the instant 
statute or in the legislative history suggests that 
Congress used these words in a new and broader sense. 
~' ,... -
At most Congress may have intended to postpone the 
effectiveness of transportation orders in "de facto" 
cases and in cases in which district court judges have 
misused their remedial powers. 
The question, therefore, must be whether the 
lower court order in this case was for the purpose of 
achieving racial balance as that phrase was used in 
Swann. 
